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In this study, we address the effect of anxiety measured with the State-Trait Anxiety
Inventory (STAI) on EEG and risk decisions. We selected 20 high and 20 low anx-
ious participants based on their STAI trait scores in the upper or lower quartile of the
norm distribution and implemented a risk game developed in our laboratory. We
investigate if high anxious individuals exert more cognitive control, reflected in
higher frontal midline theta (FMT) power when they make a risky decision, and if
they act less risky compared to low anxious individuals. Participants played a risk
game while we recorded their brain responses via EEG. High anxious participants
played less risky compared to low anxious participants. Further, high anxious partici-
pants showed higher FMT power immediately before they chose one of two risk
options, suggesting higher cognitive control during the decision time compared to
low anxious participants. Via a mediation analysis, we show that the effect of anxiety
on risk behavior is fully mediated by FMT power. Further, questionnaire responses
revealed that high anxious participants rated risk situations as riskier compared to low
anxious participants. We conclude that anxious individuals perceive risky situations
as riskier and thus exert more cognitive control during their risk choices, reflected in
higher FMT power, which leads to less risky decisions.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Decision making under risk implies the possibility of differ-
ent outcomes that can be positive or negative. When an anx-
ious participant is facing a risky decision, he or she will
perceive the possibility of a negative outcome as even more
aversive than a participant who is not anxious (Browning,
Behrens, Jocham, O’Reilly, & Bishop, 2015; Giorgetta et al.,
2012). Risky decisions might be generally aversive for anx-
ious participants since they potentially imply harmful out-
comes (Charpentier, Aylward, Roiser, & Robinson, 2017),
and increased sensitivity to potentially harmful outcomes is a
core attribute of anxiety (e.g., Gray & MacNaughton, 2000).
In line with this, it has been shown that anxious participants
express more pessimistic risk estimates (Lerner & Keltner,
2001; Maner & Schmidt, 2006; St€ober, 1997) and expect
more negative outcomes of future events (Giorgetta et al.,
2012; Lerner & Keltner, 2000). Anxious participants also
show less risky behavior (Giorgetta et al., 2012; Hartley &
Phelps, 2012; Maner & Schmidt, 2006; Maner et al., 2007;
Raghunathan & Pham, 1999). Consequently, anxious partici-
pants should exert more cognitive control when they make a
risky decision to avoid aversive outcomes.
Recent evidence suggests that frontal midline theta
(FMT) power reflects cognitive control and is associated
with anxiety (Cavanagh & Frank, 2014; Cavanagh & Shack-
man, 2015; Osinsky, Karl, & Hewig, 2016). The underlying
theory is that FMT power reflects the adjustment of behavior
in uncertain situations, a process that is especially pro-
nounced in anxious individuals (Cavanagh & Shackman,
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2015). In the studies that led to this theory, FMT power was
higher when participants had to exert more cognitive control
because the task was more difficult to solve, for example,
when the task elicited a response conflict. Here, we address
an open question about how FMT power relates to risky
behavior. We used an established risk paradigm developed in
our laboratory (Schmidt & Hewig, 2015; Schmidt, Mussel,
& Hewig, 2013; Schmidt et al., 2017) that requires decisions
between a riskier and a less risky option. We predicted that
high anxious participants produce greater FMT power com-
pared to low anxious participants when making their risk
decisions. In addition, we predicted that higher FMT power
is associated with less risky decisions. We also included an
induction of state anxiety in our study to see if the effects of
trait anxiety can be increased by state anxiety, leading to less
risky behavior and higher FMT power.
Anxiousness is often related to depression (Gorman,
1996). Therefore, we also assessed depression scores of par-
ticipants to see if depression explains risk behavior or FMT
power. According to the mood-repair hypothesis, participants
who are in a bad mood are willing to take risks to feel better
(Leith & Baumeister, 1996). As depression goes along with
negative mood, we expected riskier behavior for participants
with higher depression scores. Note that the direction of this
effect is in the opposite direction of the hypothesized effect
for anxiousness. Concerning FMT power, there have been
attempts to establish FMT power as a biomarker for depres-
sion, but without too much success (Gold, Fachner, & Erk-
kilä, 2013). Therefore, our analysis of the relation of
depression scores and FMT power is explorative.
Taken together, we address the open question of how
FMT power is associated with risk behavior in a sample of
low and high anxious individuals. We employed an estab-
lished risk paradigm developed in our lab that requires par-
ticipants to choose between a riskier and a less risky option.
We predicted higher FMT power during the decision phase
in high anxious participants. As an additional exploratory
part of the study, we induced state anxiety to see if the




Initially, 125 participants were recruited via local online plat-
forms and advertisements. They filled in an online question-
naire including the trait part of the State-Trait Anxiety
Inventory (STAI) to measure trait anxiety (Spielberger, Gor-
such, & Lushene, 1970; German version by Laux, Glanz-
mann, Schaffner, & Spielberger, 1981). Research on anxiety
differentiates between trait and state anxiety. Trait anxiety
implies a motive or behavioral disposition to perceive
nondangerous circumstances as threatening. State anxiety is
characterized by subjective, consciously perceived feelings
of apprehension and tension (Spielberger, 1966). The STAI
consists of two parts, one that measures state anxiety and one
that measures trait anxiety. Both parts contain 20 questions
that can be scored from 1 (not at all) to 4 (very much). The
minimum score in both STAI parts is 20, and the maximum
score is 80. The online questionnaire only included the STAI
trait. In the initial sample, the average STAI trait score was
39.3 (SD5 10.4). From this initial sample, we selected 20
participants with STAI trait scores in the upper quartile of
the STAI norm table for the high anxious group and 20 par-
ticipants with STAI trait scores in the lower quartile of the
STAI norm table for the low anxious group. Participants in
the high anxious group had significantly higher trait anxious-
ness scores (M5 46.6, SD5 7.5) on the STAI trait compared
to the low anxious group (M5 26.6, SD5 2.4), t(23.0)5
11.4, p< .001, d5 3.6. We only included participants who
spoke German fluently and did not report any psychiatric or
neurological disorder. Each group included 14 female and 6
male participants. The average age of the high anxious par-
ticipants was 24.6 years (SD5 3.3 years, range 20–33 years)
and of the low anxious participants 23.9 years (SD5 3.4
years, range 19–32 years).
For the behavioral effect of less risky choices in the
group of high anxious participants compared to the group of
low anxious participants (d5 .9), we reached a post hoc
power of .87 with alpha5 .05, computed with G*Power
(Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). We selected
extreme groups, based on the upper and lower quartile of the
STAI trait norm scores, increasing the possibility to detect
effects compared to a normally distributed sample. On aver-
age, participants received a bonus of 6.63 Euros (SD5 0.21
Euros) according to their achievements during the risk game.
Additionally, they were paid 5 Euros for participation or
received course credit. The experiment lasted about 90 min.
The study conforms to the Declaration of Helsinki and was
approved by the ethics committee of the University of
W€urzburg.
2.2 | Procedure
At the beginning of the experiment, participants read instruc-
tions and signed an informed consent statement. Then, an
electrode cap for recording the EEG was placed on their
head. Participants sat on a comfortable chair in front of a
computer monitor at a distance of approximately 60 cm in a
dimly lit room. They completed two questionnaires while the
EEG recording was prepared: the general depression scale or
Allgemeine Depressions Skala (ADS) measuring depression
scores (Hautzinger, Bailer, Hofmeister, & Keller, 2012) and
the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking questionnaire (DOS-
PERT), where participants rate the riskiness of situations in
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five domains: ethical, financial, health, recreational, and
social (Blais & Weber, 2006; Johnson, Wilke, & Weber,
2004). Afterward, participants played a risk game that was
programmed and performed using PsychoPy (Peirce, 2008).
Statistical analyses were performed with R (R Development
Core Team, 2017). For between-groups t tests, we used the
Welch unequal variances t test implemented in R that cor-
rects the degrees of freedom in case of unequal variances.
For analysis of variance (ANOVA) effects, we report gener-
alized eta-squared values as effect sizes.
2.2.1 | Risk game
Participants played a risk game as in past studies of our
group (Schmidt et al., 2013, 2015, 2017). Participants played
two blocks of the risk game, each consisting of 60 trials. The
two blocks were separated by the STAI state anxiety ques-
tionnaire to measure state anxiety scores and an anxiousness-
inducing movie scene that will be described below.
At the beginning of each trial in the risk game, a fixation
cross was shown for a random interval between 300 and 700
ms (Figure 1). Then, two options were presented. Both
options consisted of two monetary rewards. The expected
value of both options was 5.5 cents, but the degree of riski-
ness differed between the options, from 11 cents versus 0
cents as the riskiest option and 6 cents versus 5 cents as the
safest option. The participants always chose between the
riskiest option (11 cents vs. 0 cents) and one of the less risky
options (10 or 1 cent, 9 or 2 cents, 8 or 3 cents, 7 or 4 cents,
6 or 5 cents), presented to the participants in randomized
order and at randomized locations. Participants were required
to choose an option by pressing the left or right mouse but-
ton. After another random interval between 300 and 700 ms,
two cards were shown face down (Figure 1). Participants
chose one of the cards by pressing the left or right mouse
button. After another random interval between 300 and 700
ms, the back of the selected card was shown. In 50% of
trials, the card showed a diamond indicating that the partici-
pant won the higher monetary reward. In the other 50% of
trials, the card showed a square indicating that the participant
won the lower monetary reward. The card symbol was
accompanied by the feedback “You get XX cents!” The
feedback and the card were presented for 1,500 ms. All stim-
uli in the risk game occupied about 68 of visual angle hori-
zontally and 48 vertically. Each block lasted approximately
10 min. At the end of the experiment, participants received
feedback concerning their total earnings and were paid the
corresponding amount.
2.2.2 | Induction of state anxiety
After the first block of the risk game, participants filled in
the STAI state anxiety questionnaire. Then, participants
watched a 3.5-min movie scene taken from the movie “Hal-
loween” to induce state anxiety (Hewig et al., 2005; Philip-
pot, 1993; Riepl, Mussel, Osinsky, & Hewig, 2016). The
movie scene shows a woman ascending a staircase. Upstairs,
she finds a lot of dead bodies. Then, she is chased by the
murderer and tries to escape. The movie scene was presented
without sound and with dimmed light. Participants’ task was
to concentrate on the movie scene and to identify with the
main character. After watching the movie scene, participants
played the second block of the risk game. In the end, partici-
pants filled in the STAI state form again to assess how state
anxiety changed after watching the movie scene. Further,
participants indicated if they knew the movie scene and were
provided with the opportunity to comment on the scene or
on the experiment in general.
2.3 | EEG recording and ERP quantification
The EEG was recorded from 32 Ag/AgCl electrodes using a
BrainAmp amplifier (Brain Products GmbH, Gilching, Ger-
many). All electrodes were referenced to the electrode Cz.
Impedances of all electrodes were kept below 10 kX. Data
were sampled at 500 Hz and band-pass filtered online (0.016
Hz to 250 Hz). For offline data processing, EEGLAB
(Delorme & Makeig, 2004) running under the MATLAB
environment (The MathWorks, Inc.) was used.
For offline analysis, the sampling rate was reduced to
250 Hz. For eye artifact correction, independent component
analysis (ICA) was applied as proposed by Debener, Thorne,
Schneider, & Viola (2010). The artifact-corrected data were
then rereferenced to averaged electrodes TP9 and TP10. For
ERP analysis, the data were low-pass filtered with 20 Hz.
For each participant and channel, the EEG data were then
segmented into epochs around the events of interest. For
FMT analysis, EEG data were segmented into epochs around
the presentation of risk options (-1,000 ms, 2,000 ms).
FIGURE 1 Time course of one trial in the risk game
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Residual artifacts were identified by statistical criteria (joint
probability, kurtosis) and removed from all further analysis.
To quantify FMT power, we performed a wavelet analy-
sis as described in HajiHosseini and Holroyd (2013). We
used complex Morlet wavelets to compute power values for
frequencies between 1 and 20 Hz for every trial and averaged
the trials for every participant. The time-frequency resolution
was 1 Hz in our analysis. Then, we computed a baseline
between 2500 ms and 2200 ms before the presentation of
options and performed a baseline correction for every partici-
pant. Finally, we extracted power values for the theta range
(4–8 Hz) in a time window between 100 ms and 360 ms at
electrode FCz to get FMT power values for every participant
and condition. This time window is in line with observations
reported in reviews of FMT by Cavanagh and Frank (2014)
and Cavanagh and Shackman (2015). For plotting, we aver-
aged power values over participants after baseline correction
and performed a logarithm transformation to plot data as dB
change from baseline.
3 | RESULTS
3.1 | Questionnaires and manipulation check
The scores in the ADS generally range from 0, indicating the
lowest depression score, to 60, indicating the highest depres-
sion score. Participants in the high anxious group had higher
ADS scores (M5 15.7, SD5 10.9) compared to the low anx-
ious group (M5 5.8, SD5 3.0), t(21.9)5 3.9, p< .001,
d5 1.2. STAI trait anxiety scores and ADS depression
scores were significantly correlated, r5 .63, p< .001.
To test the effects of the movie on participants’ state anx-
iety, we applied an ANOVA on STAI state scores with the
between-subjects factor group (high anxious, low anxious)
and the within-factor movie (before movie, after movie). The
main effect of group reached significance, F(1, 38)5 5.3,
p5 .03, h25 .1, d5 .6, with higher state anxiety scores in
the high anxious group (M5 37.0, SD5 7.3) than in the low
anxious group (M5 32.7, SD5 6.9). Also, the main effect of
condition was significant, showing higher state anxiety
scores after the movie (M5 37.0, SD5 8.3) than before
watching the movie (M5 32.7, SD5 5.6) F(1, 38)5 16.6,
p< .001, h25 .1, d5 .6. The interaction of group and condi-
tion was not significant (p5 .5). After the experiment, 8 out
of 40 participants indicated that they knew the movie and 6
out of 40 participants commented on the fact that the scene
was presented without sound.
As a measure for the evaluation of risk situations, we
included the DOSPERT as described above. The scores in the
DOSPERT generally range from 40 as the lowest riskiness
evaluation and 280 as the highest riskiness evaluation. Partici-
pants in the high anxious group rated the presented situations
as riskier (M5 178.6, SD5 17.3) compared to participants in
the low anxious group (M5 149.2, SD5 32.1), t(29.2)5 3.6,
p5 .001, d5 1.1. The strong linearity of this effect is high-
lighted by the positive correlation of STAI trait anxiety scores
and the evaluation of risky situations, r5 .50, p5 .001. The
higher the trait anxiousness score of the participant, the riskier
he or she evaluated the presented situations. Subsequently, we
analyzed the five subscales (ethical, financial, health, recrea-
tional, social) of the DOSPERT concerning the difference
between high and low anxious participants. High anxious
participants rated situations in four domains as riskier com-
pared to low anxious participants: ethical, t(29.2)5 2.4,
p5 .02, d5 0.8; financial, t(26.9)5 2.3, p5 .03, d5 0.7;
health, t(28.7)5 3.6, p5 .001, d5 1.1; recreational, t(34.5)5
2.9, p5 .006, d5 0.9. Only the social subscale did not show a
significant difference between high and low anxious partici-
pants (p5 .6).
3.2 | Risk behavior
Participants chose one of the presented risk options after on
average 1.8 s (SD5 0.7 s). To obtain the percentage of risky
decisions for every participant, we divided the number of tri-
als in the risk game where the participant chose the riskier
option by the number of all trials. A mixed two-factor
ANOVA on the percentage of risky decisions in the risk
game, with group as the between-subjects factor (high anx-
ious, low anxious) and movie as the within-subject factor
(before movie, after movie), revealed a main effect of group,
F(1, 38)5 8.0, p5 .007, h25 .16, d5 .9, with high anxious
participants being 20% less risky (M5 44%, SD5 20%) than
low anxious participants (M5 64%, SD5 23%). The main
effect of condition did not reach significance (p5 .3), but the
interaction between group and condition did: F(1, 38)5 6.6,
p5 .01, h25 .02. Post hoc t tests revealed that risk behavior
of the high anxious group did not change following the
movie presentation (p5 .3), but in the low anxious group,
participants were riskier after watching the movie, t(19)5
2.8, p5 .01, d5 .6, see Figure 2. Finally, we tested if
depression scores, measured with the ADS, are associated
with the percentage of riskier decisions for every participant,
collapsed over both parts of the experiment (before and after
the movie). The correlation of depression scores and risk
behavior did not reach significance (p5 .6). We also per-
formed a correlation between the overall DOSPERT scores
and risk behavior, which also did not reach significance
(p5 .06).
3.3 | Frontal midline theta analysis
We analyzed FMT power measured at electrode FCz
(Figure 3). A mixed two-factor ANOVA on FMT power,
with group as the between-subjects factor (high anxious, low
anxious) and movie as the within-subject factor (before
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movie, after movie), revealed a main effect of group, F(1,
38)5 7.8, p5 .008, h25 .11, d5 .9. FMT power was higher
in the high anxious group (M5 1.4, SD5 0.3) compared to
the low anxious group (M5 1.2, SD5 0.2; Figure 3). All
other effects did not reach significance (all ps> .6). Depres-
sion scores, measured via the ADS, were not associated with
FMT power (p5 .4) nor did overall DOSPERT scores pre-
dict FMT power (p5 .1).
3.4 | Mediation analysis
To see how trait anxiety, measured with the STAI trait, FMT
power, and risk behavior are related, we performed a media-
tion analysis following Baron and Kenny (1986). The corre-
lations of the three parameters are depicted in Figure 4. In
this analysis, anxiety served as the predictor variable, FMT
power as the mediator, and risk behavior as the outcome
variable (Figure 5). As the first step, we tested if anxiety pre-
dicts risk behavior. The regression analysis revealed a signif-
icant b5 - 0.007, p5 .04. Correspondingly, the correlation
of anxiety and risk behavior was r5 -.32, p5 .04 (Figure 4).
As the second step, we tested if anxiety predicts FMT power.
The regression analysis revealed a significant b5 0.010,
p5 .01. Correspondingly, the correlation of anxiety and
FMT power was r5 .39, p5 .01 (Figure 4). FMT power in
turn predicted risk behavior. The higher participants’ FMT
power during the decision phase, the less risky were their
decisions, r5 -.47, p5 .002 (Figure 4). The corresponding b
value in the regression analysis was b5 - 0.384, p5 .002.
An inspection of the scatter plots in Figure 4 reveals that
there is one outlier with very high FMT power. When we
exclude this outlier, the correlations survive. As the third
step of the mediation analysis, we tested if the effect of anxi-
ety on risk behavior disappears when FMT power is included
in the regression. Results of the regression analysis show that
the effect of anxiety on risk behavior is indeed not significant
(p5 .3) when FMT power is included in the regression.
Therefore, FMT power fully mediates the effect of anxiety
on risk behavior. To test if this mediation is statistically sig-
nificant, we used the R package mediation by Tingley,
Yamamoto, Hirose, Keele, and Imai (2014). We used boot-
strapping and set the number of simulations to 1,000. The
average causal mediation effect (ACME) was significant,
ACME520.003, p5 .02.
4 | DISCUSSION
Here, we show that FMT power was enhanced in high anx-
ious participants immediately before they made risky deci-
sions compared to low anxious participants. High anxious
participants rated situations as riskier compared to low anx-
ious participants in a questionnaire asking for evaluations of
risk situations and, consistent with previous results, acted
less risky compared to low anxious participants in a risk
game (Giorgetta et al., 2012; Hartley & Phelps, 2012; Maner
& Schmidt, 2006; Maner et al., 2007; Raghunathan & Pham,
1999). Most importantly, FMT power predicted the riskiness
of these decisions: When FMT power was high, the deci-
sions were less risky. Further, a mediation analysis revealed
that the effect of anxiety on risk behavior was fully mediated
by FMT power.
We interpret these findings as evidence for enhanced
cognitive control in high anxious individuals in order to
avoid negative outcomes. For anxious participants, risky
decisions might be generally aversive (Charpentier et al.,
2017). A risky decision therefore induces conflict, compara-
ble to the conflict situations described in previous studies
that investigated FMT power (Cavanagh & Frank, 2014;
Cavanagh & Shackman, 2015). In these studies, FMT power
was enhanced when participants made an error, were pun-
ished, or when there was a response conflict. Our results are
in line with studies indicating enhanced activity of the ante-
rior cingulate cortex (ACC) during decision making in partic-
ipants with high trait anxiety (Paulus, Feinstein, Simmons, &
Stein, 2004). The cingulate cortex is also the source of FMT
(Cavanagh & Shackman, 2015). FMT power is associated
with cognitive control and anxiety (Cavanagh & Frank,
2014; Cavanagh & Shackman, 2015; Osinsky, Karl, &
Hewig, 2016). Our FMT results suggest that the cognitive
control process implemented by ACC inhibits the selection
of risky behaviors in anxious individuals.
There are two key structures in the brain that are impor-
tant for anxiety: the amygdala, which responds directly when
a threatening stimulus appears (Davis, 1992; Kim & Whalen,
FIGURE 2 High anxious participants acted less risky than low anx-
ious participants. Error bars are standard errors
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2009), and the prefrontal cortex, which is responsible for the
control of affective responses (Davidson, 2002). The amyg-
dala and the prefrontal cortex are closely connected via neu-
ronal pathways. The better the neuronal connection between
the amygdala and the prefrontal cortex, the lower are trait
anxiety scores of participants (Kim & Whalen, 2009).
Further MRI studies found that participants with high trait
anxiety show higher activation in the anterior cingulate and
the medial prefrontal cortex during decision making (Paulus
et al., 2004) and a hyperactive emotional system (Xu et al.,
FIGURE 3 Higher frontal midline theta at FCz in the high anxious group compared to the low anxious group during the time from presentation of
risk options to their decision. The black rectangles indicate the analyzed window from 100ms to 360ms after option presentation in the theta range
(4–8 Hz)
FIGURE 4 Correlations of STAI trait scores, percent riskier decisions, and FMT power
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2013). The anterior cingulate cortex is important in decision
making, as it is responsible for the selection and motivation
of extended behavior (Holroyd & Umemoto, 2016). There is
evidence for enhanced activity of the anterior cingulate cor-
tex during decision making in participants with high trait
anxiety (Paulus et al., 2004). Therefore, our results fit per-
fectly with the existing literature on the neuronal mecha-
nisms involved in anxiety.
The induction of state anxiety via a 3.5-min scene from
the movie “Halloween” led to higher state anxiety scores
and, thus, we consider it a successful anxiety induction
method in line with previous results (Hewig et al., 2005;
Philippot, 1993; Riepl et al., 2016). But the impact of the
movie scene on risk behavior and FMT power was different
from our expectations. Low anxious participants played even
riskier after watching the anxiety-inducing movie scene,
whereas we predicted that state anxiety would lead to less
risky behavior. In high anxious participants, there was no
significant change in risk behavior before and after the
movie. Riskier behavior after the movie in the low anxious
group could be a result of the attempt to repair the negative
mood induced by the movie scene by taking more risks
according to the mood repair hypothesis (Leith & Baumeis-
ter, 1996). Unfortunately, we did not measure mood changes
in our study, so we cannot tell if the movie scene elicited
negative mood in addition to state anxiety. Also, it is not
clear why this effect should only apply to low anxious partic-
ipants. Another interesting result in this regard is the fact that
scores in the ADS were related to anxiousness scores, but
did not explain the differences in risk behavior between the
high and low anxious groups. If mood repair was the main
process regarding changes in risk behavior, depression
should be related to risk behavior. Taken together, we did
not find the expected changes in risk behavior after the suc-
cessful induction of state anxiety. Also, FMT power did not
vary after the induction of state anxiety. It is possible that
other ways to induce state anxiety would be more effective
than watching a movie scene (Schmidt, Warns, Hellmer,
Ulrich, & Hewig, 2018).
To our knowledge, this is the first study showing that
FMT power predicts risk behavior and fully mediates the
relationship between anxiety and risk behavior. The higher
participants’ FMT power during the decision time, the less
risky were participants’ decisions. Anxious participants did
not only play less risky in the risk game, they also rated risky
situations as being riskier. As anxious participants are afraid
of potentially harmful events, they appear to exert greater
cognitive control when making risky decisions, which is
reflected in higher FMT power and results in more conserva-
tive behavior.
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